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Abstract
Recent research has clearly demonstrated that economic development is closely related to environmental quality.
In last two decades this relationship has been described by the Environmental Kuznets Curves that postulates an
inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution and income. However, while theoretical and empirical research
has focused on the polluting effects of economic development, few have identified the policy instruments which
can be introduced to counteract such negative effects. This paper concentrates on one of these instruments and
examines how environmental taxation is related to economic development. The introduction of environmental
taxes usually requires strong regulation capabilities such as effective monitoring and enforcement. We assume
that these capabilities reflect the integrity of the institution of rule of law and examine how the strength of rule of
law affects the environmental taxation-income path. Data from 28 European countries analysed confirm the
existence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between environmental taxation and per capita income. The
empirical results clearly demonstrate that the environmental taxation-income relationship is strongly influenced
by the rule of law which, when strong, ensures that environmental policies are implemented effectively. A strong
rule of law thus contributes to achieving a turning point at lower levels of per capita income. Our analysis also
made it possible to identify differences in environmental taxation-income paths among European countries,
showing that post-transition economies may have not yet reached the turning point of the curve due to the
presence of a weaker rule of law.
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1. Introduction
Extensive theoretical and empirical research suggests that improvements in environmental
quality with the rise of per capita income, could reflect how successfully environmental
policies are implemented. In this paper we analyse the relationship between income and
taxation, one of the most important marked-based instruments for environmental protection.
To the best of our knowledge the economic literature does not provide a clear picture
concerning the relationship between environmental taxation and economic activity, as
represented by per capita income. The idea that environmental taxation may first increase
with rising income before it starts to decline with even higher income is a hypothesis that we
denominate as Environmental Taxation Kuznets Curve (ETKC). This relationship, being the
result of successfully implemented environmental protection policies, is proved to be strongly
influenced by the institutional context.
The relationship between economic development and environmental quality has been
widely discussed. This relationship is usually measured by the Environmental Kuznets Curve
(EKC) that defines the links between economic growth and environmental degradation.
Models that investigate the existence of EKC propose an inverse U-shaped curve whereby,
starting from lower levels of per capita income, pollution increases gradually to reach a peak
before decreasing at a turning point at higher levels of per capita income. The evidence of the
classical EKC is usually based on various theories relating how socioeconomic progress
relates to environmental protection (Galeotti et al., 2006). One of these theories considers
environmental quality as a socially preferred good. This theory suggests that, as economic
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thus opting for environmental protection as active policy and not simply as the consequence
of economic development. This theory, therefore, points towards compatibility between
economic growth and a clean environment that can be achieved through application of
effective environmental policies. The introduction and application of these policies, in turn,
depend to a great extent on the stringency of the institutional context. In fact, the quality of
institutions is proved to strongly affect the functioning of environmental policies (Bhattarai
and Hammig, 2004; Dasgupta et al., 2001; Leitão, 2010; Magnani 2000).
Numerous studies confirm the importance of market-based policy instruments, such as
environmental taxes, for pollution reduction (for example, Ekins, 1999; Ekins and Barker
2001; EEA, 2005; Scrimgeour et al., 2005). The use of environmental taxation is found to
produce a double dividend by achieving not only environmental but also economic
improvements (Bosquet 2000). It is argued that tax extraction from polluting factors instead
of production factors leads to the rise in economic growth (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1997).
While the results of environmental protection are well documented in empirical
studies, the factors that contribute to its implementation are left in the shade. Some studies
make an effort to analyse environmental protection and evidence factors crucial for its
efficacy (Barker 2001; Ekins and Barker, 2001; Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1997). One of these
factors should be institutional enforcement. Among others, institutions such as the protection
of property rights, legal origins, democracy and governance have been shown to have an
important impact on the quality of the environment (Cole, 2007; Leitão, 2010; Weisbuch,
2000). However, among the institutions studied from an environmental perspective, that of
rule of law has not yet received attention its deserves. Given that implementation of
environmental policies and particularly of environmental taxation, rarely occurs without state
intervention, the strength of the rule of law, which is an institution of governance, is expected
to have a decisive impact. We hypothesize that the rule of law plays a double role in
environmental taxation implementation. The first is a direct mechanism that refers to the
impact that the rule of law has on environmental taxation, since strong rule of law has a
positive impact on the enforcement of the taxation system. In turn, there is an indirect impact
that works through the positive contribution that the rule of law gives to economic growth.
Since taxation is commonly related to per capita income, which is assumed as ability to pay,
the rule of law, through its contribution to economic growth, indirectly affects environmental
taxation.
In this paper, therefore we advance two hypotheses. The first evaluates the existence
of the Environmental Taxation Kuznets Curve, i.e. an environmental taxation–income path. In
particular, we show that the relationship between environmental taxation and per capita
income results in an inverse U-shaped curve. The second hypothesis tests whether the turning
point of ETKC is influenced by the stringency of the rule of law. We demonstrate that
enforcement of the rule of law shifts the turning point to lower levels of per capita income,
accelerating the improvement of environmental quality.
2. Background
An increasing body of empirical research (for reviews see Dasgupta et al., 2002; Dinda, 2004;
Stern, 2004), has confirmed the existence of the EKC for various polluters in different
countries, including European countries (Bimonte, 2002; Markandya et al., 2006; Dutt, 2009;
Lipford and Yandle, 2010). The presence of this curve indicates the progress achieved in
environmental protection policies. Various studies put forward a wide range of factors that
contribute to this progress, such as an increase in welfare and economic openness, shift to
3green technologies, switch in preferences verso clean products, among others. Not
surprisingly, environmental policy plays a decisive role in determining how these factors
influence environmental protection.
In turn, some studies have demonstrated that the successful implementation of
environmental policies is determined by the institutional context. For example, corruption has
been shown, at theoretical and empirical level, to have a negative effect on the environment,
undermining the effectiveness of such policies (Cole, 2007; Damania et al., 2003; Leitão,
2010, Lopez and Mitra, 2000, Welsch, 2004). In contrast, strong institutions in the form of
political liberties, civil rights and democracy have been shown to positively contribute to
environmental issues (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001; Frankel and Rose, 2002; Torras and
Boyce, 1998) as have secure property rights (Culas, 2007) and legal protection (Di Vita,
2009).
Rule of law is one of the most important institutions that determines the successful
implementation of policies (Galeotti, 2007). Kaufmann et al. (2010) define the rule of law as
the “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”. Environmental policies are
therefore dependent on the quality of this institution as it determines the functionality and
applicability of these policies. Although the link between the quality of the rule of law and
effective environmental policies is not surprising, very few empirical studies have shown that
a reinforced rule of law improves environmental quality (Panayotou, 1997; Bhattarai and
Hammig, 2001, Castiglione et al. 2012).
Inter alia, environmental taxation is one of the instruments that policy makers
introduce to compel private users of environmental resources to take account of the social
costs of their actions. As argued in the early literature (Pigou, 1932 and Baumol 1972),
environmental taxation would improve social welfare since this tax is imposed to neutralise a
negative externality. Today it is demonstrated that the double dividend produced by
environmental taxation through environmental improvements and gains in economic
performance greatly enhances environmental effectiveness (Bosquet 2000, Bovenberg and de
Mooij, 1997, and Scrimgeour et al., 2005). At the same time, it needs to be still understood
which the factors are responsible for the effectiveness of this policy.
Here, we evaluate the extent to which the European environmental taxation is
determined by the strength of the rule of law and how its enforcement contributes to reversing
the gradual increase in pollution. Most policies aimed at environmental improvement and
preservation were introduced in Europe at the end of eighties and beginning of nineties. The
emergence of these policies was initially instigated by increasing public awareness of
environmental damage and the widespread realisation of its detrimental effect to the long-
term goals of economic development (EEA, 1995).
Since then, the taxation system in European countries has passed through complex
evolution processes that witnessed the introduction of different forms of taxes designed to
perform different functions. A large part of these environmental taxes has been proven to be
effective (EEA, 2005). Some notable examples are Germany’s introduction of taxation on
leaded petrol which led to the rapid substitution of this polluting fuel with an environmentally
less damaging one; the decrease in the amount of waste delivered to landfill sites in Denmark
after the introduction of a tax on waste treatment; the reduction of traffic in urban centres after
a traffic congestion charge was introduced in various European cities (Ekins, 1999).
These are a few of the many examples that demonstrate that when environmental taxes
successfully reduce polluting factors, less taxation is subsequently required. Therefore, in
conditions where the rule of law is strong and policies are properly reinforced, the volume of
environmental taxation may actually first increase and then decrease as a consequence of the
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such as Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have achieved much progress in
application of environmental taxation policy (Scrimgeour et al., 2005). These countries have
successively reduced emission levels, and this has led to the decrease of environmental
taxation inflow. Even though, the revenue generation through tax extraction, was not the
primary aim of environmental policy, most of these countries recycle the revenue obtained
from taxation back into economy by reducing income tax and increasing investments, which
significantly enforces the economic performance. The success in introduction such
environmental taxes has induced the European Environmental Agency to prefigure a reform
of the tax system, denominated Environmental Tax Reform (ETR). According to EEA (2005),
the ETR is a change in the national tax system that shifts the burden “from economic
function, sometimes called ‘goods’, such as labour (personal income tax), capital (corporate
income tax) and consumption (VAT and other indirect taxes), to activities  that lead to
environmental pressures and natural resources use, sometimes called ‘bads’ (EEA, 2005:
83)”. The main aim of this taxation policy shift in European countries is to reconcile
economic growth and the environment (Ekins, 2011).
In the light of progress achieved in environmental policies we advance the hypothesis
that the relationship between environmental taxation and income per capita should exhibit an
inverse U-shaped profile, strongly influenced by the stringency of the rule of law. Therefore,
we evaluated the existence of what we term an Environmental Taxation Kuznets Curve
(ETKC), The increasing slope of the curve is found in conditions where income and
institutions are growing, and environmental taxes are introduced. When these taxes achieve
major efficacy, the ETKC curve reaches a turning point with the pollution levels that stop
increasing and start declining. This turning point reflects a moment when relatively high level
of income per capita is achieved and institutional quality is improved. At this point, no further
increase in taxation is needed since the existing one is able to promote pollution abatement.
The decrease of emission levels implies a diminishing taxation burden. The relationship
between environmental taxation and income would, therefore, result in an inverse U-shaped
curve, where emissions would increase with more intense environmental protection measures
and decrease with less intensive measures, supported by the stringency of the rule of law.
In providing our analysis we assume that heterogeneity should exist in environmental
taxation-income path in different countries. In fact, the theory of opportunity costs states that,
in pollution abatement, wealthy countries have lower opportunity costs with respect to less
developed countries (Khanna and Plassmann, 2004). Therefore, given that the demand for
environmental quality is income-elastic (Bimonte, 2002; Khanna and Plassmann, 2004;
Magnani, 2000), higher income per capita and a strong institutional context are both
associated with lower exposure to pollution. In fact, despite the fact that less developed
countries with weak institutions work towards pollution abatement (Galeotti, 2007; Magnani,
2000), in many cases their environmental progress is undermined by unenforced regulations.
This explains how the environmental protection, income and institutions are related. Under
the strong rule of law the turning point of the ETKC would shift leftward, towards lower
income point. This is because a strong institutional context facilitates environmental policies
and provides more effective environmental protection even at lower income levels. Therefore,
we argue that countries with different institutional enforcement would demonstrate
heterogeneous environmental taxation-income paths.
3. Model
To verify the existence of an inverse U-shaped curve of the environmental taxation-income
5relationship and the influence of the rule of law on the behaviour of this curve, we start by
considering direct and indirect effect the rule of law has on environmental taxation. In
addition to the direct effect that the rule of law has on environmental taxation, there is an
indirect effect on taxation through the influence of the rule of law on per capita income.
Our analysis is based on the alternative specification of the inverse U-shaped curve
proposed by Bradford et al. (2005). This approach provides has the advantage of a more
robust estimation as it avoids the use of nonlinear transformations of nonstationary regressors,
a problem that occurs in quadratic and cubic regression functions1. This specification also
allows us to better capture the direct and indirect effects.
The indirect effect is evaluated with the following growth equation:
ititittiit XRY   21 (1)
where real GDP per capita )( itY is a function of the rule of law )( itR and other regressors
)( itX . The matrix )( itX consists of classical variables of the growth model, such as capital
stock level of education and share of trade in GDP, while i and t correspond to
unobserved specific effects of country and year respectively.
To capture the direct effect we set the change of environmental taxation )(ET as a
function of the growth rate of GDP )(g and of the distance of income )(y from the turning
point )( *y :
gyy
t
ETt )( *

 (2)
Therefore, ET increases until the turning point *y is reached and decreases after this
when the coefficient  is negative, and g is positive. A negative sign of  reflects the
inverse U-shaped relationship between environmental taxation and GDP per capita.
To incorporate the indirect effect in the direct one we follow the approach proposed by
Leitão (2010), and establish the turning point *y as a function of the rule of law )(RoL :
Roly 21
*   (3)
We assume that 02  so that the stronger rule of law implies lower levels of GDP
per capita at the turning point *y . Taking together and integrating with respect to time
equations (2) and (3), while keeping income, average growth rate and average degree of the
rule of law constant, we obtain:
gtRoLyETt ))(( 21   (4)
where  is a constant of integration.
To estimate equation (4) we use the following reduced form, transforming
environmental taxation into logarithms:
1 The estimation of the pollution-income relationship based on these functions were found to suffer from
severe econometric misspecifications (for a review see Stern 2004).
6ititiiiiiiit ZtgRoLtgtgyET   3210 )()()(ln (5)
where the countries are indexed by i and time by t . ET is the environmental tax per capita,
iy is the average real per capita GDP, ig is the average real per capita GDP growth and iRoL
is the average of the degree of the rule of law, all measured over the sampled period.
Additional explicative variables are defined by matrix itZ . These variables are expected to
influence the level of environmental taxation: the level of corruption, the quality of
regulation, index of economic freedom, tax revenue in GDP and the share of exports and
imports in GDP.
To obtain yi and ig we refer to the indirect effect of the rule of law on environmental
taxation and calculate the fitted values of itY by estimating equation (1). By computing the
average value of per capita GDP of the first )( 1iY and the last )( 2iY four year period of the
total of GDP series for each country, we obtain the average of per capita GDP and its growth
rate in the following way:
)10exp(12 iii gYY  (6)
)5exp(1 iii gYy  (7)
where iy and ig are interpolated values at a sample mid–point.
On the basis of the estimation of equation (5) we evaluate the existence of the EKTC
and the influence of the rule of law on the position of the curve.
4. Data, variables and descriptive statistics
To estimate environmental taxation-income relationship, we used the environmental taxation
data provided by Eurostat Environmental Accounts (2011). Environmental taxation is
measured in millions of euros divided by millions of ECU. Among the explicative variables
we introduce the rule of law index (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Data on this index, from 1996 to
2002, is available every two years, while data from 2003 to 2008 is given yearly. The missing
data for the year 1997, 1999, 2001, is imputed as the average value between two years.
Other independent variables used are: the quality of regulation, index of economic
freedom, level of corruption, tax revenue in GDP and shares of exports and imports in GDP.
The first three variables reflect the quality of institutional environment, which influences the
process of tax collection. Strong regulator quality, transparent economic systems and low
corruption limit tax evasion, increasing budget tax revenues. The measures of the quality of
regulation and level of corruption are also provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010). The index of
economic freedom is taken from the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal (2010). The
variable on tax revenue in GDP reflects the volume of various taxes collected and indicates
the capacity of regulator to collect taxes. Finally, economic openness expressed in imports
and exports reflects the level of economic activity, influencing pollution, and therefore, the
amount of environmental tax revenues. Data on both variables were taken from World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). We expect all explicative variables to have a
positive relationship with environmental taxation.
Data used in this analysis was obtained from a panel of 28 European countries and
spans the timeframe from 1996 to 2008 for a total of 392 observations. Table 1 reports the
7description of variables and source of data, while Table 2 presents a summary of the sample
statistics.
To obtain interpolated values of average income per capita )( iy and its growth rate
)( ig and estimate the indirect effect of the rule of law on the environmental taxation–income
relation we utilize classical variables of economic growth models (equation 1). These
variables are real per capita GDP, capital per worker, education and share of export and
import in GDP, all obtained from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). For the
purpose of better capturing the indirect effect, we divided countries according to their stage of
economic development. This division was necessary in the light of criticisms put forth by
Vincent (1997) and Galeotti (2007) on probable overlapping of country data series. This must
be considered in our model since we have high-income observations from market-economy
countries and low-income observations from post-transition countries. Moreover, this division
is useful to capture how different economic production and institutional conditions affect
income and, therefore, environmental taxation. The first group (G1) includes European
countries characterized by mature industrial and/or service sectors, such as Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Countries that, according to the European Union regional policies, present
delayed development in industrial and/or a growing service sectors at either national or
regional level constitute the second group (G2): Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta,
Portugal and Spain. Former transition countries with shrinking agricultural sector and
developing industrial and service sectors were assigned to the third group (G3): Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
5. Estimations and discussion
One of the problems when estimating a growth model (equation 1) is the possible endogeneity
between the rule of law and income. In fact, countries tend to enter virtuous circles of
institutional and economic development. To address the problem of endogeneity, the rule of
law was instrumented by considering (i) the fraction of population that speaks English as a
mother tongue; (ii) the fraction of population that speaks one of the five primary Western
European languages, including English as a mother tongue and (iii) the index of economic
freedom. First-stage regression indicates the validity of the instrumental variables used here.
Moreover, the validity of the first two instruments has been confirmed by Cole (2007), Hall
and Jones (1999) and Leitão (2010).2 The endogeneity of the rule of law was also tested with
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the results of which (not reported in the table) led to rejection
of the null hypothesis that the rule of law is exogenous.
The growth model (equation 1) is estimated for the three groups of countries: G1, G2,
G3. Given the presence of fitted values of iy and ig we do not express variables in natural
logarithms (Leitão, 2010), and instrument the rule of law by using 2SLS (Table 3). As
suspected, rule of law )( itR does not have the same influence on income across the three
groups of countries. In the G1 group the rule of law has a positive and significant impact on
income, while in the G2 group the rule of law has a negative but a significant impact. This
unexpected sign can be due to the fact that institutional performance in these countries
aggravated in the presence of increasing per capita income. It seems that the worsening effects
2 Other variables, such as country’s distance from the equator, a dummy for legal origin were added as
instruments in the regression but they did not prove to be valid.
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expected, in former-transition countries (G3), which present the lower average value of the
rule of law index, there is no statistically significant relationship between income and the rule
of law. Other variables such as capital stock, level of education and economic openness,
expressed through exports and imports, all have a significant positive effect on income, with
the exception of Edu in the G2 group.
Dealing with panel data, we considered the difference between fixed and random
effect models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). To estimate equation 1 we preferred the random
effects model since introducing time invariant instruments prevented the potential correlation
between country–specific effects and the explanatory variables. In estimating the direct effect
of the rule of law on environmental taxation (equation 5), it is very likely that a country’s
unobservable characteristics can be correlated with income, thus making it more appropriate
to consider estimates derived from fixed effects. Moreover, given the significance of
Hausman test statistics, the random effects model was rejected in favour of the fixed effects
model.
The ETKC model (equation 5, table 4) was first estimated considering only ygt , gt and
RoLgt (specification 1). These variables were all significant with expected signs. As
discussed in Section 2, the negative sign of the coefficient on ygt indicates the presence of
the inverse U-shaped environmental taxation - income relationship in European countries.
These results confirm our first hypothesis: with the growth of income, environmental taxation
first increases to counteract damaging pollution effects and then decreases, once pollution
starts to decline as a consequence of successfully applied environmental taxation policy. It is
worth noting, that the coefficient on RoLgt is positive, demonstrating the expected positive
relationship between the strength of the rule of law and environmental taxation.
Our findings also confirm the second hypothesis on the importance of the rule of law for
the position of the environmental taxation – income path. As demonstrates the estimated value
of 2 which is negative and statistically significant (Table 4), the strong rule of law
determines the turning point of the EKTC at a lower level of income per capita. Under the
strong rule of law, the turning point of environmental taxation – income path shifts to the left,
meaning a major efficiency of environmental taxation policy, where pollution abatement is
enhanced even at lower income levels.
Successively, other explanatory variables were added (specification 2): control of
corruption )(CCorr , regulation quality )(Re gQual , index of economic freedom )(Ecfree ,
tax revenue in GDP )Re( vTax and share of exports and imports in GDP int)(XIM . As
expected, all the variables carry positive signs and are statistically significant. Control of
corruption and regulation quality have a greater effect on environmental taxation with respect
to index of economic freedom and economic openness, while the effect of taxation revenue is
very small.
The final hypothesis we test is that of the presence of heterogeneity in the
environmental taxation-income path between different economies. We believe that market-
economy countries (mark) with strong rule of law have already reached a turning point in the
ETKC, while post-transition countries (ptrans) with lower levels of income and a weaker rule
of law have just started the declining trend or have not yet reached a turning point.
Heterogeneity in the environmental taxation-income relationship is introduced by relaxing the
assumption that these two groups of countries have the same turning point, which is
influenced by the state of the rule of law. Following Leitão (2010) we investigate this
heterogeneity allowing for different income slopes across countries.
The descriptive analysis of the data confirms this hypothesis. For the purpose of
illustration, Figure 1 shows the environmental taxation-income path for three market-
9economies and three post-transition countries. As is evident, market-economy countries have
already achieved their turning point and have reduced environmental taxation, while post-
transition countries are still characterized by an upward slope which can be due to their weak
rule of law enforcement.
To test for heterogeneity, we add two additional variables, ptranstgy ii * and
)*( ptranstgRoL ii , which incorporate the effect of rule of law in post-transition economies in
equation 5 to obtain:
ititiiiiiiiiiiit ZptranstgRoLtgRoLtgptranstgytgyET   3222110201 )*()()()*()(ln (8)
Estimation results obtained from equation 8 are presented in Table 4. Specification 1a
contains basic variables, while specification 2a includes the control variables. Given that all
the variables are statistically significant in all estimations, the heterogeneity assumption can
be rejected.
To determine if the inverse U-shape curve characterizes the environmental taxation–
income relation, we test the hypothesis of 001  and 00201  for the market-economy
and post-transition countries respectively. By testing the hypothesis 0
01
21 


and
0
0201
2221 


 for market-economy and post-transition countries, we evaluate whether a
relationship exists between the rule of law and per capita income at the turning point. The
results show (Table 5) that market-economy countries are characterized by the inverse U-
shape environmental taxation-income path, where the enforced rule of law leads to a turning
point which occurs at a lower level of per capita income. As for post-transition economies, in
the basic specification of the model (1a) there is no evidence for the EKTC path and no
impact from the rule of law. The evidence of the curve and the rule of law influence appears
only when other control variables are considered (2a). This is probably due to the fact that
post-transition economies have not yet achieved much progress in applying environmental
policies and should pay more attention to the enforcement of the rule of law.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we focus on the links between environmental protection policy and economic
growth, assessing how this relationship is influenced by the quality of institutions in European
countries. In particular, we advance the hypothesis that the relationship between
environmental taxation and per capita income is an inverse U-shaped curve, which is based on
the presumable success achieved by European countries in pollution abatement. We argue that
the rule of law plays a decisive role in the environmental taxation-income relationship by
increasing the effectiveness of environmental policies. Our analysis also explains the
differences in the progress achieved in the application of environmental policies in market-
economy and post-transition countries.
The analysis covered 28 European countries and utilized data from between 1996 and
2008. To check for the existence of the inverse U-shaped relationship between environmental
taxation and per capita income, we apply an innovative Bradford et al. (2005) approach that
avoids estimation of nonlinear regression and increases its robustness. While existing
literature, such as Leitão 2010, extends Bradford et al. (2005) model to check for corruption
effects for pollution – income relation, we take another direction and study how the
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relationship between environmental protection and income is influenced by the rule of law.
Nonetheless, our work can be also considered as a robustness test for the methodology
presented by the above mentioned authors.
To investigate the role of the rule of law in the relationship between environmental
taxation and per capita income we firstly address the indirect effect of the rule of law on
environmental taxation through its impact on income per capita. Our results confirm the
widely held opinion in economic literature opinion that the rule of law is positively related to
per capita income in market-economy countries. At the same time, the direct effect of rule of
law on environmental taxation demonstrates that enforcement of the rule of law has a positive
impact on environmental policy application. In fact, we confirm the presence of an inverse U-
shaped curve of environmental taxation – income relation for the entire panel where the rule
of law has a negative impact on per capita income at the turning point of the curve. Therefore,
countries with enforced rule of law achieve greater progress in environmental policies at a
lower per capita income level and have thus already reduced environmental taxation levels.
We also control for the heterogeneity in the environmental taxation – income path
between market-economy and post-transition countries. The results show that post-transition
economies have not yet reached the turning point of the environmental taxation - income
curve and this probably reflects weaker enforcement of the rule of law which thus hinders the
proper implementation of environmental policies.
As for policy implications, our analysis suggests that the effective implementation of
environmental protection policies can be the result enforcement of the rule of law which
deserves close attention in designing functional environmental policies to favor economic
development.
References
Baumol, W., 1972. On taxation and the control of externalities. Am. Econ. Rev. 62, 3, 307–
321.
Bhattarai, M., Hammig, M., 2001. Institutions and the Environmental Kuznets Curve for
deforestation: a cross–country analysis for Latin America, Africa, and Asia. World
Dev. 29, 6, 995–1010.
Bhattarai, M., Hammig, M., 2004. Governance, economics policy, and the environmental
Kuznets curve for natural tropical forests. Environ. Devel. Econ. 9, 3, 367-382.
Bimonte, S., 2002. Information Access, Income Distribution, and the Environmental Kuznets
Curve. Ecol. Econ. 41, 1, 145–156.
Bosquet, B., 2000. Environmental tax reform: does it work? A survey of the empirical
evidence. Ecol. Econ. 34, 19–32.
Bovenberg, A.L., de Mooij, R.A. 1997. Environmental tax reform and endogenous growth. J.
Public. Econ. 63, 207-237.
Bradford, D.F., Fender, R.A., Shore, S.H., Wagner, M., 2005. The Environmental Kuznets
Curve: Exploring a Fresh Specification. Contrib. Econ. Analysis Policy. 4, 1, 1–28.
Butkiewicz, J.L., Yanikkaya, H., 2006. Institutional quality and economic growth:
Maintenance of the rule of law or democratic institutions, or both? Econ. Model. 23, 4,
648–661.
Cameron, A.C., Trivedi, P.K., 2009. Microeconometrics Using Stata. College Station, Texas.
Castiglione, C., Infante, D., Smirnova, J. 2012. Rule of law and the Environmental Kuznets
Curve: evidence for carbon emissions, Int. J. Sust. Econ. 4, 3, 254–269.
Cole, M.A., 2007. Corruption, income and the environment: an empirical analysis. Ecol.
11
Econ. 62, 4, 637–647.
Culas, R.J., 2007. Deforestation and the environmental Kuznets curve: an institutional
perspective. Ecol. Econ. 61, 2, 429–437.
Damania, R., Fredriksson, P.G., List, J.A., 2003. Trade liberalization, corruption, and
environmental policy formation: theory and evidence. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 46, 3,
490–512.
Dasgupta, S., Mody, A., Roy, S., Wheeler, D., 2001. Environmental regulation and 10
development: a cross-country empirical analysis. Oxford Devel. Stud. 29, 2, 173–187.
Di Vita, G., 2009. Legal families and environmental protection: Is there a causal relationship?
J. Policy. Model. 31, 5, 694–707.
Dinda, S., 2004. Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis: A Survey. Ecol. Econ. 49, 4,
431–455.
Dollar, D., Kraay, A., 2000. Property Rights, Political Rights, and the Development of Poor
Countries in the Post–Colonial Period. World Bank Working Papers. Washington, DC.
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth.
Dutt, K., 2009. Governance, institutions and the environmental–income relationship: a cross–
country study. Environ. Devel. Econ. 11, 4, 705–723.
EEA (European Environment Agency), 1995. Environment in the European Union. Report for
the Review of the Fifth Environmental Action Programme.
EEA (European Environment Agency), 2005. Market-based instruments for Environmental
Policy in Europe, EEA Technical Report No. 8/2005, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Ekins, P., 1999. European environmental taxes and charges: recent experience, issues and
trends. Ecol. Econ. 31, 1, 39–62.
Ekins, P., Barker, T., 2001. Carbon taxes and carbon emissions trading. Journal of Economic
Surveys 15, 3, 325–352.
Ekins, P., 2011. Introduction to the issues and the Book. In: Ekins, P., Speck, S. (Eds.),
Enviromental Tax Reform (ETR). A policy for Green Growth, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Frey, B.S. 1999. Morality and Rationality in Environmental Policy. Journal of Consumer
Policy 22: 395–417, 1999.
Galeotti, M., 2007. Economics Growth and the Quality of the Environmental: Taking Stock.
Environ. Dev. Sustain. 9, 4, 427–454.
Galeotti, M., Lanza, A., Pauli, F., 2006. Reassessing the environmental Kuznets curve for
CO2 emissions: A robustness exercise. Ecol. Econ. 57, 1, 152–163.
Frankel, J.A., Rose, A.K., 2002. Is Trade Good Or Bad For The Environment? Sorting Out
The Causality. Working Paper 9201, NBER.
Hall, R.E., Jones, C.I., 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more output per
worker than others? Q. J. Econ. 114, 1, 83–116.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2010. The Worldwide Governance Indicators: A
Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Research.
Khanna, N., Plassmann, F., 2004. The demand for environmental quality and the
environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. Ecol. Econ. 51, 3-4, 225–236.
Knack, S., Keefer, P. 1995. Institutions and economic performance: cross–country tests using
alternative institutional measures. Econ. Politics. 7, 3, 207–227.
Leitão, A., 2010. Corruption and the environmental Kuznets Curve: Empirical evidence for
sulfur. Ecol. Econ. 69, 11, 2191–2201.
Lipford, J.W., Yandle, B. 2010. Environmental Kutnets curves, carbon emissions, and public
choice. Environ. Devel. Econ. 15, 4, 417–438.
Lopez, R., Mitra, S. 2000. Corruption, pollution, and the Kuznets environment curve,  Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 40, 137-150.
12
Magnani, E., 2000. The Environmental Kuznets Curve, environmental protection policy and
income distribution. Ecol. Econ. 32, 3, 431–443
Markandya, A., Golub, A., Pedroso-Galinato, S., 2006. Empirical analysis of national income
and SO2 emissions in selected European countries. Environ. Resour. Econ. 35, 3, 221–
257.
Panayotou, T., 1997. Demystifying the Environmental Kuznets Curve: turning a black box
into a policy tool. Environ. Devel. Econ. 2, 4, 465–484.
Pigou, A.C., 1932. The Economics of Welfare. 4th ed. Macmillan, London.
Scrimgeour, F., Oxley, L., Fatai, K., 2005. Reducing carbon emissions? The relative
effectiveness of different types of environmental tax: the case of New Zealand.
Environmental Modelling & Software 20, 1439–1448.
Stern, D. I., 2004. The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve. World Dev. 32, 8,
1419–1439.
Torras, M., Boyce, J.K., 1998. Income, inequality and pollution: reassessment of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve. Ecol. Econ. 25, 2, 147–160.
Vincent, J.R., 1997. Testing for environmental Kuznets curves within a developing country.
Environ. Devel. Econ. 2, 4, 417–431.
Weisbuch, G., 2000. Environment and institutions: a complex dynamical systems approach.
Ecol. Econ. 35, 3, 381–391.
Welsch, H., 2004. Corruption, growth and the environment: a cross-country analysis.
Environmental and Development Economics, 9, 663-693
13
Figure 1: Trends in per capita environmental tax revenue and per capita income
A) market-economy European countries
B) post-transition European countries
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Table 1: Data information
Variable Definition Source
Y Real per capita GDP WDI (2010)
Kpw Capital Stock per worker WDI (2010)
R Rule of Law Kaufmann (2010)
CCorr Control of Corruption Kaufmann (2010)
EcFree Index of Economic Freedom Heritage Formation and Wall
Street Journal (2010)
EDU School enrolment, tertiary (% gross) WDI (2010)
Engfrac Fraction of a country’s population that speaks
English as a mother tongue
Hall and Jones (1999)
Envtax Environmental tax Eurostat (2010)
Eurfrac Fraction of a country population that speaks one
of the five primary Western European
languages, including English as a mother
tongue
Hall and Jones (1999)
RegQual Regulation Quality Kaufmann (2010)
TaxRevenueGDP Tax Revenue (% of GDP) WDI (2010)
XIMint Share of exports + imports in GDP WDI (2010)
Table 2: Sample summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Y 24723.22 11987.3 5921.674 74421.63 363
Kpw 8459.583 5676.116 374.5925 32710.88 352
R 1.148901 0.580172 -0.193140 1.964045 364
CCorr 1.156859 0.794892 -1.021719 2.47 364
EcFree 66.15247 7.229807 45.7 82.6 364
EDU 53.12494 18.25695 9.626324 94.88895 321
Engfrac 0.061286 0.223440 0 0.974 364
Envtax 6.391923 0.637011 4.68375 7.654727 363
Eurfrac 0.244464 0.394537 0 1.004 364
RegQual 1.162789 0.423399 -0.234753 2.012003 364
TaxRevenueGDP 20816.41 4955.785 10700 32700 256
XIMint 105.6177 50.04793 44.15393 318.2252 362
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Table 3: Estimation results for growth equation (1)
G1 G2 G3
R 9,252.85 -6,659.37 993.273
(4,661.173)* (2,121.705)*** (1762.512)
Kpw 1.404 1.557 2.013
(0.137)*** (0.167)*** (0.234)***
Edu 34.469 34.651 52.179
(20.879)* (25.81) (8.016)***
XIMsh 52.481 43.318 36.532
(11.664)*** (11.905)*** (7.301)***
Constant -6,787.14 13,409.26 -106.849
(7379.95) (2,288.912)*** (1346.251)
Obs 119 70 122
N. of id 11 7 10
R–squared 0.776 0.828 0.844
Wald χ^2 577.25 222.7 2242.27
Prob. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4: Estimation results based on interpolated values (Equation 4)
1 2 1a 2a
ygt -0.91 -1.298 -0.53 -1.072
(0.201)*** (0.238)*** (0.246)** (0.306)***
ygt*ptrans 0.218 0.15
(0.053)*** (0.061)**
gt 9.118 12.021 3.912 8.978
(1.744)*** (2.063)*** (2.332)* (2.935)***
RoLgt 0.632 1.154 1.424 1.782
(0.215)*** (0.255)*** (0.343)*** (0.352)***
RoLgt*ptrans -1.185 -1.192
(0.372)*** (0.449)***
CCorr 0.116 0.103
(0.043)*** (0.042)**
RegQual 0.131 0.134
(0.048)*** (0.048)***
EcFree 0.007 0.005
(0.002)*** (0.002)**
TaxRevenueGDP 0.00003 0.00003
(0.000)*** (0.000)**
XIMint 0.002 0.001
(0.001)** (0.001)*
Constant -44.618 -25.587 -44.749 -31.438
(3.256)*** (4.808)*** (3.240)*** (5.235)***
-0.649 -0.889
p-value (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 338 241 338 241
Number of id 26 26 26 26
R-squared 0.59 0.72 0.61 0.73
F-test 145.99 66.94 95.49 55.58
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman 444.29 91.16 483.00 135.80
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
j2
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Table 5: Estimation results for heterogeneity model (equation 8)
(Y1a) (Y2a)
Market-economy European countries
01 -0.91 -1.298
(0.032)** (0.000)***
01
21


-2.687 -1.662
(0.015)** (0.000)***
Post-transition European countries
0201   -0.312 -0.922
0.107 (0.003)***
0201
2221




-0.766 -0.64
0.1678 (0.007)***
p-value in parentheses
Statistically significant: * at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
